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Abstract
We explore the conversion of classical secret-sharing
schemes to quantum ones, and how this can be used
to give ecient qss schemes for general adversary
structures. Our rst result is that quantum secret-
sharing is possible for any structure for which no
two disjoint sets can reconstruct the secret (this was
also proved, somewhat dierently, in [7]). To obtain
this we show that a large class of linear classical ss
schemes can be converted into quantum schemes of
the same eciency.
We also give a necessary and sucient condiion
for the direct conversion of classical schemes into
quantum ones, and show that all group homomorphic
schemes satisfy it.
1 Introduction
A classical secret sharing scheme is a (usually) ran-
domized encoding of a secret s into a n-tuple, the co-
ordinates of which are each given to dierent players
in the player set P . The encoding is a secret sharing
scheme if there exists a collection A of subsets of P
(called the adversary structure) such that no set of
players in A gets any information about s from their
shares, but any set of players not in A will be able
to compute s. The classic example of this is due to
Shamir [11]. He gives a construction based on poly-
nomials over a nite eld of a threshold secret-sharing
scheme for any threshold t and any number of players
(in such a scheme, A = fB  P : jBj  tg).
The idea of sharing quantum secrets was rst de-
scribed and solved for the case t = 1; n = 2 by Hillery
et al. in [8]1. A more general solution, for all t > n2−1,
∗Work done while author was at McGill University, Mon-
treal. Supported by an NSERC undergraduate research grant.
1In fact, [8] shows how ecency can be gained in the in-
secure channels model by combining the key distribution and
secret-sharing layers of the protocol. An even more ecient
protocol was suggested in [10].
was recently given by Cleve et al. (CGL, [4]). Their
scheme is a direct generalization of the well-known
Shamir scheme [11], with all calculations done unitar-
ily and \at the quantum level", i. e. replacing random
choices with equal superpositions over those choices.
In next section we give denitions and back-
ground. In section 3, we then prove that classical
linear secret-sharing schemes, with an appropriate
adversary structure, can be converted into quantum
schemes with the same complexity, both in terms of
share size and encoding/reconstruction. This gives
another proof of theorem 8 from [7]. In the last sec-
tion, we give a necessary and sucient condition for
(not necessarily linear) classical ss schemes to become
quantum ones when run at the quantum level, and ob-




Given a set of players P , an adversary structure
A over P is a set of subsets of players which is
downward-closed under inclusion:
(B 2 A and B0  B) =) B0 2 A:
Normally such a structure is used to represent the
collection of all coalitions of players which a given
protocol can tolerate without losing security: as long
as the set of cheating players is in A, the cheaters
cannot breach the security of the protocol.
Secret-sharing schemes usually tolerate threshold
structures, which are of the form A = fB  P : jBj 
tg for some t. However, when working with more gen-
eral structures, the following denitions prove useful.
Denition 1 An adversary structure A  2P is Q2
if no two sets in A cover P , that is
6 9B1; B2 2 A : B1 [B2 = P:
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Denition 2 The dual of an adversary structure A
over P is the collection
A = fB  P : Bc =2 Ag
where Bc denotes the complement P −B.
Denition 3 A structure A over P is Q2 if its dual
A is Q2. This means that any two sets not in A will
have a non-empty intersection.
It is interesting to note that A is Q2 i A  A.
Dually, A is Q2 i A  A. Consequently, a collec-
tion is self-dual i it is both Q2 and Q2.
2.1.1 Monotone functions
We can dene a partial order on f0; 1gn by the rule
\x  y i each coordinate of x is smaller than the
corresponding coordinate of y."
By identifying f0; 1gn with 2f1;::: ;ng, the relation 
on f0; 1gn corresponds to inclusion () in 2f1;::: ;ng.
Then a monotone function f corresponds to a func-
tion from 2f1;::: ;ng to f0; 1g such that A  B =)
f(A)  f(B).
Such a monotone function f naturally denes an
adversary structure Af = f−1(f0g) = fB  P :
f(B) = 0g. Moreover, f is called Q2 (resp. Q2) i
Af is Q2 (or Q2).
2.2 Monotone span programs
Span programs were introduced as a model of com-
putation in [9]. They were rst used for multiparty
protocols in [5] under this name, although a similar
construction, attributed to Brickell, already existed
([12]). In this section we dene some concepts re-
lated to monotone span programs.
Denition 4 A monotone span program (MSP)
over a set P is a triple (K;M; ) where K is a nite
eld, M is a de matrix over K and  : f1; : : : ; dg !
P is a function which eectively labels each row of M
by a member of P .
The MSP associates to each subset B  P a subset
of the rows ofM : the set of rows l such that  (l) 2 B.
This corresponds to a linear subspace ofKe (the span
of those rows). The monotone function f : 2P !
f0; 1g dened by a MSP is given by the rule \f(B) =
1 if and only if the target vector  = (1; 0; 0; : : : ; 0)
is in the subspace associated with B". If we denote
by MB the submatrix of M formed of the rows l such
that  (l) 2 B then we get that
f(B) = 1 ()  2 Im(MTB ):
In fact, given any monotone function f , we can
construct a MSP which computes it. The size of the
MSP will be at most proportional to the size of the
smallest monotone threshold formula for f , but may
in some cases be exponentially smaller [1, 5].
The proof uses the following fact from linear alge-
bra. Here the dual of a vector subspace W is denoted
W? = fu : u>w = 0 8w 2Wg.
Remark: Denote the dual of a vector subspace W
by W? = fu : u>w = 0 8w 2 Wg. For any
matrix M we have Im(M>) = ker(M)?. Thus,
f(B) = 0 i 9v : MBv = 0 and >v 6= 0.
2.2.1 Secret-sharing from MSP's
Given a MSP (K;M; ), we can dene a classical
secret sharing scheme which tolerates the adversary
structure Af induced by the MSP. Say the dealer has
a secret s 2 K. He extends it to an e-rowed vector
by adding random eld elements a2; : : : ; ae to make
a vector s = (s; a2; : : : ; ae). The dealer gives the
lth component of s^ = Ms to player P (l). If s^A
denotes the elements of s^ with indices in A where
A  f1; : : : ; dg, then each Pi receives s^ −1(i).
The ss scheme thus dened tolerates exactly the
adversary structure Af .
Note that the concept of MSP’s is very general: any
linear secret-sharing scheme (i.e. one in which the
encoding of the secret is given by a linear map over a
eld) can be formulated as a MSP-based scheme [5].
The Shamir scheme is a special case, where M is a
n  (k + 1) Vandermonde matrix, e = k + 1, d = n,
and  is the identity on f1; : : : ; ng.
2.3 Secret sharing with general access
structures
With classical data, secret sharing is possible for any
access structure. Given a monotone threshold for-
mula for a function f , Benaloh and Leichter [2] gave
a construction for Af with ecency proportional to
the size of the formula. This is improved on by con-
structions based on monotone span programs (sec-
tion 2.2.1), which are always at least as ecient
as the Benaloh-Leichter scheme but can be super-
polynomially more so.
When sharing quantum data, the situation is
slightly dierent. Because of the no-cloning theo-
rem, it is impossible to share secrets with an adver-
sary structure which is not Q2 (since then one can
2
nd two disjoint sets which can reconstruct the se-
cret based on their shares). Because a pure-state qss
scheme is also a quantum code correcting erasures on
the sets described by its adversary structure, we also
get that any pure-state qss scheme has an adversary
structure which is in fact self-dual [4]. The natural
converse to this is
Theorem 1 Given any Q2 structure A, we can nd
a qss scheme for A. If A is self-dual, then the
scheme can be a pure-state one.
This was proved for the case of threshold structures
in [4]: their construction works when the number of
cheaters t is more than n2 − 1 (i. e. it takes more
than n2 players to reconstruct the secret). Moreover,
theirs is a pure-state scheme when n = 2t+ 1 (these
correspond to the Q2 and self-dual conditions, re-
spectively).
The full theorem was stated but not proved in [4].
We give a proof here, based on monotone span pro-
grams. Another proof, due to Daniel Gottesman and
based on purication of quantum superoperators, ap-
peared in [7].
3 Quantum secret-sharing from
classical linear schemes
We assume that the reader is familiar with the nota-
tion and basic concepts of quantum computing. For
clarity, we will ignore normalization factors.
3.1 Pure-state linear QSS
Cramer et al. [5] pointed out that any linear secret-
sharing scheme can be realized as a MSP-based
scheme. In this section, I show that any MSP
with adversary structure A gives rise to a quantum
erasure-correcting code for erasures occuring on any
set of positions in A\A. In the case where A is self-
dual, this yields a pure-state quantum secret-sharing
scheme for A.
The idea is the same as that for the CGL scheme
[4]. First choose a MSP, say (K;M; ). Note that
wlog all e rows of M are linearly independent and
so we can extend M to an invertible dd matrix M 0.
We can construct a quantum circuit ~M implementing
multiplication by M 0 and thus encode a basis state












(The expression s()a denotes the column vector ob-
tained by adjoining s to the beginning of the vector a).
This scheme can be extended by linearity to ar-
bitrary states ji = Ps2K s jsi. The pieces of the
encoded state are then distributed according to the
function  . We have:
Theorem 2 Let (K;M; ) be a MSP with a.s. A.
Then the encoding above is corrects erasures on any
set of positions in A \A.
To prove this, we need to show for any set B which
is in A but whose complement is not, the players
in A can reconstruct the encoded data. We give a
reconstruction procedure. The proof consists of the
two following lemmas.
First we show the existence of certain vectors used
in the reconstruction process.
Lemma 3 Let (K;M; ) be a MSP with a.s. A.
Suppose B 2 A\A (i.e. A = P −B is in A). Then
there exists an invertible linear transformation U on
the shares of A such that after the transformation,
1. the rst share contains the secret s;
2. all remaining shares, including those of players
in B, are distributed independently of s when the
e− 1 other components of s are chosen at ran-
dom.
Proof: Say A contains m shares. Then we
must construct m linearly independent vectors
u1;u2; : : : ;um such that
1. u>1 MAs()a = s;
2. If U 0 is the matrix with rows given by
u2; : : : ;um, then the value
U 0MA()MBs()a
is distributed independently of s.
To satisfy the rst condition, pick any u1 such
that u>1 MA = >. Such a vector must exist since
by hypothesis the players in A can reconstruct
the secret.
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To satisfy the second condition, it’s enough to
ensure there exists v such that U 0MA()MBv = 0
and >v 6= 0 (see section 2.2).
Since B 2 A, we know that there is a v such
that >v 6= 0 and MBv = 0. Furthermore, the
subspace W = fu 2 Km : u>MAv = 0g has
dimension m − 1, and u1 is not in that space
since u>1 MAv = 
>v 6= 0. Hence any basis
fu2; : : : ;umg of W will do.
The matrix U whose rows are given by the ui’s
gives the desired transformation. Note that the
U doesn’t depend on a. 2
Finally we show that the reconstruction process
works:
Lemma 4 Let (K;M; ) be a MSP and let B 2 A\
A, A = P − B. Suppose a quantum state ji =P
s2K s jsi is encoded as described at the beginning
of this section. Then the shares in A can be used to
reconstruct ji. Consequently, no information on ji
can be obtained from the shares in B.
Proof: Consider the case when ji = jsi for some




Construct a quantum circuit for the map b 7−!
Ub, where U is constructed as in lemma 3. De-
note by U 0 the matrix obtained by removing the
rst row of U . Applying the circuit for U only
to the components of the encoded state corre-








However, by construction the joint distribution
of U 0MAs()a and MBs()a is independent of s
when a is chosen uniformly at random (lemma






By a strong form of the no cloning theorem, the
correctness of the reconstruction implies that the
shares of B give no information at all on ji. 2
(This completes the proof of theorem 2).
When the adversary structure A dened by a MSP
is Q2, we have A  A. Hence, the previous theorem
shows that erasures on any set of coordinates inA can
be corrected. In addition, if A is self-dual (i. e. both
Q2 and Q2) then the qualied sets are precisely the
complements of sets in A and hence every qualied
set can reconstruct the secret but no unqualied set
gets any information on it. Thus we have shown the-
orem 1 for the case of self-dual structures.
3.2 Mixed-state linear QSS
To handle structures which are simply Q2, we follow
the strategy of [4]: rst extend to a self-dual structure
and then \trace-out" the new share(s).
To extend a structure A over a player set P , add a
new player to P (say ):
Lemma 5 For any Q2 adversary structure A over
a player set P , the structure A0 over the set P 0 =
P [ fg given by
A0 = A [ B [ fg : B 2 A}
is self-dual and its restriction to P yields A.
Proof: Elementary, using the fact that
A is Q2 () A  A. 2
Thus, a pure-state QSS scheme for A0 will yield a
mixed-state scheme for A by throwing out the share
corresponding to  . For the construction to be e-
cient, we need the following:
Lemma 6 Given a MSP for A, an MSP for A0 can
be eciently constructed.
Proof: Note that the new access structure is Γ0 =
Γ [ fB [ fg : B 2 Γg (here Γ;Γ;Γ0 are the
complements of A;A;A0 resp.). Thus if f; f; f 0
are functions detecting membership in A;A;A0
respectectively, and if f detects the presence of
 in a set, then f 0 = f _ (f ^ f ).
Now to construct the desired MSP, rst obtain
an MSP for A according to [6]. The MSP for
A0 can then be constructed by composition from
MSP’s calculating and and or. 2
The resulting MSP is at most a constant times the
size of the original.
4
4 QSS from classical SS
A natural conjecture given the results of the previous
section is that any classical secret-sharing scheme for
an adversary structure will give a quantum erasure-
coorecting for erasures in A\A. I show here a con-
dition on the scheme for this to be the case. Not all
schemes satisfy the condition, though a large class of
them does, in particular group-homomorphic ones.
The corollary to this, as before, is that when A
is self-dual, the resulting quantum scheme is a qss
scheme for A. Note that the main dierence between
the proof we give here and that of the preivous section
is that here we don’t guarantee that the reconstruc-
ton procedure is ecient, only that it exists and is
unitary.
4.1 A general condition
A classical secret sharing scheme can be thought of
as a probabilistic map E from a secret space S into n
\share spaces" Y1; : : : ;Yn. The random input can
be modeled as a choice from some set R with a
given probability distribution. Now consider some
set U 2 A \ A and let Q = U c be its complement
(Q is qualied). Let S be the random variable cor-
responding to the secret and let Yu and Yq be those
corresponding to the shares in U and Q respectively.
Denote their concatenation E(S) = Y = YuYq. Fi-
nally, let Yu;Yq be the share spaces for U and Q and
let Y = Yu  Yq be the global share space.
Note that for the SS scheme to be perfect we must
have
Correctness: H(SjYq) = 0. Equivalently, S =
f(Yq) for some deterministic function f .
Secrecy: I(S;Yu) = 0. Equivalently, P (Yu =
yujS = s) = P (Yu = yujS = s0) = P (Yu =
yu) 8s; s0 2 S.
Suppose now we have a quantum secret which is a
linear superposition of shares in S and a unitary map





P (Y = yjS = s) jyi








P (Yu = yujYq = yq) jyui
We want to decide if this is can correct erasures on
U . To do so requires showing that the density matrix
of the U component is independent of the secret’s
state. Note that it is not sucient to show that the
density matrix is the same for all jsi. We have to show
this for all choices of the s’s in
P
s2S s jsi. We can
compute the density matrix explicitly by imagining
that a measure is made on the Q component of the
code and the secret. We can then consider P (S =
s) to be jsj2. In what follows ρU |y
q
is the density
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5
independent of s for all y(1)u ; y
(2)
u 2 Yu. Thus
Theorem 7 Given a classical SS scheme for an
adversary structure A, the correspnding quantum
scheme corects erasures on U 2 A \ A, i Equa-
tion (1) is independent of s for all y(1)u ; y
(2)
u 2 Yu.
As unnatural as this condition seems, it is nonethe-
less satised by many SS schemes:
 If Yu is a function of Yq (as is the case in the
Shamir scheme) then we have the expression (1)
equal to 0 whenever y(1)u 6= y(2)u . Furthermore,
when y(1)u = y
(2)
u = yu the expression reduces toP
yq:f(yq)=s
P (Yu = yu; Yq = yqjS = s), which
sums to P (Yu = yujS = s). This is independent
of s by the secrecy assumption above. Thus this
type of scheme yields a secure QSS.
 A group homomorphic secret sharing scheme is
based on an injective homomorphism h : G 
Gm −! Gn for some group G. The secret s is
an element of G and the n shares are obtained
by picking v 2R Gm and calculating h(s;v).
In this case, the independence of expression (1)
from s is guaranteed by the following fact: in





u never appear with the same word yq
(that is
P (Yu = y(1)u jYq = yq)P (Yu = y(2)u jYq = yq) = 0
for all yq) or they always appear with the same
probability:
q
P (Yu = y
(1)
u jYq = yq)P (Yu = y(2)u jYq = yq)
= P (Yu = y(1)u jYq = yq):
The same analysis as before applies: qss schemes
constructed from homomorphic schemes are se-
cure. Interestingly, there seem to be no cases
where non-homomorphic schemes provide any
advantage over homomorphic ones [13].
Thus, it seems that although not all classical ss
schemes yield a qss scheme directly, the most impor-
tant ones do. However, the proof given does not give
the reconstruction procedure; it only proves its ex-
istence. It is not a priori clear that all classical SS
schemes which yield a secure QSS scheme will have
ecient (quantum) reconstruction procedures.
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